

A  
Q U E R Y  
WHETHER  
CERTAIN POLITICAL CONJECTURES  
AND  
REFLECTIONS  
OF  
*Dr. DAVENANT* in 1699,  
BE, OR BE NOT, APPLICABLE  
TO THE  
PRESENT CRISIS.

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Quis virtutem amplectitur ipsam,  
Præmia si tollas?

Juv.

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L O N D O N :  
PRINTED FOR P. ELMSLY, IN THE STRAND;  
AND J. DEBRETT, PICCADILLY.

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OCT 21 1939

CERTAIN POINTS OF VIEW

REFLECTIONS

DR. DAVID MANTON

IN A SERIES OF LECTURES

TO THE

PRESIDENT CRISIS

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LONDON:

PRINTED FOR THE EDITOR, IN THE STRAND,

AND J. GOSWELL, PICCADILLY.

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## INTRODUCTORY PREFACE.

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**T**HE Editor of the following portion of one of the works of Dr. Davenant, has no scruple of bringing it again before the public eye, though in this isolated shape, because he considers it to be singularly replete with reflections curious and instructive to every man who is attached to, and studies the constitution of England; and who is attentive to the course of the great political transactions at this alarming period.

He is sensible, that, in preferring to present this little piece in its old dress, he may not please the fashionable taste; yet, he has ventured to meet this dislike, rather than to injure the strong, good sense and nervous stile of the author, by producing it in any other form.

Besides,

Besides, let it be recollected, that the very design of the publication, is to inquire, Whether some conjectures of Dr. Davenant in 1699, be, or be not, applicable to the present government of Great Britain? and therefore, these cannot be produced, for that purpose, in any other words so properly, as in his own.

From the writings of Dr. Davenant the Editor has, in general, drawn so much useful information, that he is ever unwilling to come to a decisive opinion on matters of policy, which may have been within the reach of this author's researches, without turning, in order to see what he may have stated upon the subject. As his writings will not have obtained the same notice from every one, he wishes to mention, that Dr. Davenant wrote various Essays after the Revolution, and at the beginning of the present century. His notions, in general, were just and constitutional; yet, his writings were little relished by the Tories, at the same time, that the Whigs, who were become good courtiers, were also displeased at the freedom with which he had treated many of their half, or time-serving measures.

Dr. Davenant's Essays on Trade, Manufactures, and Revenue, are admirable; and although these are on points subject to continual variation, yet no person,

person, aiming at a competent knowledge in these branches, ought to reject the knowledge they contain on that account.

In one of these Essays, regarding *the Duty of private Men in the Administration of public Affairs*, he appears to foresee, that at some future time, one or both of the Houses of Parliament may become so corrupt, and be so devoted to the will of the minister, as to be led, through an unjustifiable confidence, to the support of measures, which may bring those very assemblies into so great a degree of disrepute with the nation, as to endanger the constitution itself.

A politician, writing at the distance of more than ninety years, will not be charged with prejudices regarding the present day; therefore, a Reader may now listen to his statement of circumstances with a confidence, which we are not inclined to give to a cotemporary writer.

If ever Great Britain shall be brought into the condition which Dr. Davenant's apprehensions have suggested may possibly be the case at some distant day, it will be admitted, that the danger will, indeed, be great for the constitution; and whenever that day shall appear, a temperate Reform of the Representative Body, enacted by themselves, will probably be found



found to be the only remedy fit to be applied to save, or rather to bring back to its genuiue purity, our most excellent constitution. The patriot will naturally observe, that if a Parliamentary Reform becomes necessary, discretion and wisdom demand that it be not delayed to so late a day, as would make the cure of an evil to be attended with danger in the execution.

Though this reasoning, in general, may be admitted, yet there are conjunctures, in which even this desirable measure may be ill-timed, and men of the clearest sagacity and penetration, who are themselves anxious for the success of a just plan of Reform, would not recommend the present moment, as the proper one for this important, but delicate consideration.

Who would not wish, in this interval of dreadful expectation, that the two Houses, having it so much in their own power, would exert the same so effectually, as to leave the Nation no ground on which to press for a hasty, or too extensive a Reform?

The sentiments of Readers are and will be different on most of the publications through which they cast an eye; on which account, the Editor reserves, for some future occasion, his own remarks,  
on

on the separate cases brought forward by Dr. Davenant; wishing to hear whether the dangers, this sagacious writer saw at a distance, appear, in the judgment of others, to bear any likeness to the actual condition of the government of Great Britain.

He contents himself, therefore, with the bare re-publication of this part of one of the Essays, abridging only from the work some few paragraphs of it, which the altered state of our laws, &c. render now inapplicable and unnecessary.

He is not without his hopes, that this re-publication, uninteresting as it may at first appear, will be found to be deserving of more than common attention.





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Dr. DAVENANT introduces the fifth Section of his ESSAY under this Head, and follows it by a Quotation from Tacitus.

*That a Country cannot increase in Wealth and Power but by private Men doing their Duty to the Public, and but by a steady Course of Honesty and Wisdom, in such as are trusted with the Administration of Affairs.*

AT Romæ ruere in Servitium Consules, Patres, Eques, quanto quis illustrior, tantò magis falsi ac festinantes. But, in Rome, all were rushing headlong into bondage; the Consuls, the Senate, the Equestrian Order; and the more elevated was the station of each, the more did they hasten to mark their own perfidy. This was the condition of Rome, when Tiberius assumed the empire, but God forbid it should be ever the case of England, for our constitution will be entirely lost when such a corruption happens; we may indeed preserve the name of liberty, and some of its outward forms, but no more  
A than

than what will help to keep our chains the faster on: Tyrannies have been often subverted, where the Princes govern meerly by their own will, without giving to their subjects the least appearance of being free; but those absolute monarchies are hardly to be shaken, and that servitude is lasting, where the people are left to make their own fetters.

It is a matter of great wonder, that from the time of *Augustus* downwards, the *Romans*, who were seldom without brave and virtuous men, should never make one attempt to restore the commonwealth, and to shake off that power which some of the Emperors exercised with such exorbitance; but in all likelihood it proceeded from this; that the soldiers and common people, without whom no great revolution can be made, believed themselves still free, because, in show, the commonwealth had the same form as in elder times: There was a senate, consuls, tribunes, and an appearance of all the ancient magistracies, though nothing remained of the ancient liberty: But this the common people did not feel, for the cruelty and fraud of *Tiberius*, the madness of *Caligula*, the stupidity of *Claudius*, the riots and lust of *Nero*, the gluttony and fordid mind of *Vitellius*, the vanities of *Otho*, and the enormous vices of *Domitian*, did little hurt to the inferior rank of men, who

who all the while had *Panem* and *Circences*, which was all they desired; but the mischiefs these monstrous princes brought upon the world, fell chiefly upon nobler heads, who yet could not rescue their country, so much were the common people lulled asleep, with the opinion they entertained, that the laws still governed, because they saw every year consuls and a senate; but this senate being corrupted, made the tyranny boundless and safe: for the people could never be induced to oppose that power which still bore some resemblance to their ancient form of government.

In the same manner, if in future ages our Parliaments should be debauched in principles, and become willing to be the instruments of a Prince's will, and to act as he directs them, arbitrary power would be here settled upon a lasting foot; for the common people would never join with any who would attempt to redeem their country, because they will be deceived by names and forms, and think the laws governed, and that they are free, if the outward show of the constitution is still preserved.

When corruption has seized upon the representatives of a people, it is like a chonical disease, hardly to be rooted out. When servile compliance and flattery come to predominate, things proceed from bad to worse, till at last the government is quite



dissolved. Absolute monarchies are in danger of great convulsions, when one man, their Prince, happens to be weak or wicked; but commonwealths, or mixed constitutions, are safe till the chief part of the leading men are debauched in principles. However, monarchy has this advantage, that the one man, their Prince, is mortal, and if bad, he may be succeeded by a better; but a people thoroughly corrupted, never returns to right reason; and we see that the depravity of manners, which began in *Rome* presently after the second *Punic* war, among the nobility and gentry, became every year worse and worse, till at last *Cæsar* destroyed the commonwealth. And after this time, under the succeeding Emperors, every senate grew more abject and complying than the other, till in process of time the old *Roman* spirit was utterly extinguished, and then that empire, by degrees, became a prey to barbarous nations.

If all parts of the state do not with their utmost power promote the public good, if the Prince has other aims than the safety and welfare of his country; if such as represent the people do not preserve their courage and integrity; if the nation's treasure is wasted; if ministers are allowed to undermine the constitution with impunity; if judges are suffered to pervert justice and wrest the law, then is a mixt government  
the

the greatest tyranny in the world; it is tyranny established by a law, it is authorised by consent, and such a people are bound with fetters of their own making. A tyranny that governs by the sword, has few friends but men of the sword, but a legal tyranny (where the people are only called to confirm iniquity with their own voices) has of its side the rich, the fearful, the lazy, those that know the law, and get by it, ambitious churchmen, and all those whose livelihood depends upon the quiet posture of affairs; and the persons here described compose the influencing part of most nations, so that such a tyranny is hardly to be shaken off. Men may be said to be enslaved by law, or their own consent, under corrupt or degenerate republics, such as was the *Roman* commonwealth from the time of *Cinna*, till the attempts of *Cæsar*, and under degenerate mixed governments, such as *Rome* was, while the Emperors made a show of ruling by law, but with an awed and corrupted senate: To which form of government, *England* was almost reduced, till the King came over to put our liberties upon a better foot.

But what has been, may be, and though we are safe during this reign, yet in after ages, bad and designing ministers may think their conduct is no way to be maintained but by the sword, and that they cannot se-

curely prey upon the commonwealth, till they have made their master absolute, upon which score, in these inquiries concerning the methods, whereby *England* may be a gainer in the general balance of trade, we think it needful to lay down, that all that wealth and power which must defend this state upon any emergencies or invasions from abroad, depends upon our preserving inviolate the ancient constitution of this kingdom.

Men do as industriously contrive fallacies to deceive themselves (when they have a mind to be deceived) as they study frauds whereby to deceive others; and if it leads to their ends, and gratifies their present ambition, they care not what they do, thinking it time enough to serve the public, when they have served themselves; and in this view very many betray their trusts, comply, give up the peoples rights, and let fundamentals be invaded, flattering themselves that when they are grown as great as they desire to be, it will be then time enough to make a stand, and redeem the commonwealth. The same notion led *Pompey* to join with those who intended to subvert the *Roman* liberties; but he found them too strong, and himself too weak, when he desired to save his country.

In the same manner, if there be any in this nation, who desire to build their fortunes  
upon



upon the public ruin, they ought to consider that their great estates, high honours, and preferments, will avail them little when the subversion of liberty has weakened and impoverished us so, as to make way for the bringing in of foreign power.

It imports all degrees of men in their several posts, to endeavour at the preserving that form of government under which we have prospered for near seven hundred years. It happens seldom that any country is totally subdued by foreign force, and civil war is, indeed, a raging fever; but it goes away of itself, when the humours that fed it are spent, and is often no more than the sign of a health too florid, and the effects only of too much blood in the body politic: But ill conduct in a state long continued, wastes it by slow and certain degrees, and at last brings an incurable consumption upon all its parts and members.

If the affairs of this kingdom should ever happen to be ill conducted, which, we hope, is a remote fear, the legislative power must then interpose with its authority, and the united wisdom of the nation must rescue us out of weak and polluted hands, for such a ministry is a surer engine to destroy a state, than any its enemies can bring against it.

It is true, such as would correct errors, and watch that no invasion may be made on liberty, have been heretofore called a faction

by the persons in power; but it is not properly their name, and ought to be given to another sort of men.

It is wrong to call them the faction, who by all dutiful and modest ways promote the cause of liberty, as the true means to endear a Prince to his subjects, and to lay upon them a stronger tie and obligation to preserve his government. For a people will certainly best love and defend that Prince, by whom the greatest immunities and most good laws have been granted.

They cannot properly be termed the faction, who desire the war should be managed upon such a foot of expence, as the nation is able to bear; who would have the public treasure not wasted, the Prince not deceived in his grants and bargains, who would have the ministry watchful and industrious, and who, when they complain, are angry with things, and not with persons.

The name of faction does more truly belong to them, who, though the body politic has all the signs of death upon it, yet say all is well, that the riches of the nation are not to be exhausted, that there is no misgovernment in all its business, that it feels no decay, and that its œconomy is perfect, and who, all the while, are as arrogant and assuming, as if they had saved that very people, whom their folly and mad conduct has in a manner ruined.

They

They may be rather termed the faction, who were *good patriots out of the Court*, but are *better courtiers* in it; and who pretended to fear excess of power while it was not communicated to them, but never think the monarchy can be high enough advanced, when they are in the administration.

In nations (where for a long time matters have not been placed upon a foot of honesty) their great assemblies consist commonly of two parties, in both of which sides there are many who have the same right intentions to the public, and many, who in all their councils consult only their private interest.

Of one side, some out of principle, love their country, and are jealous of its liberties, and yet, at the same time, are careful of their Prince's honour and interest. In all their proceeding they have nothing in view but the public good; they study not so much how to blame the past, as which way the future is to be mended; they do not accuse the statesman, and yet let the fault continue, as well knowing, that impeachments of men, and not of crimes, produce new, but seldom better ministers.

They desire the necessities of the state should be well supplied, the person of the Prince revered, and his government maintained. When his ministers have made false steps, or when their councils have had unsuccessful events, they desire not to in-  
flame



flame the assembly where they sit, but are willing rather to assist with their superior knowledge, and to bring the minds of men to the temper and calmness that is proper in weighty deliberations.

Persons of this character are in most assemblies of a people; but they are often joined and followed by such as have quite another view and aim, and who, in all their actings, consult not the common welfare, but either wreak their own discontents, or pursue some ambitious hope, and upon such, or the like accounts, mix themselves with the wiser and better sort; however, the good and the bad, being thus mingled and blended, compose altogether, what in vitious times, is called the country party.

On the other side, there are some very nice in what may intrench upon the regal authority, yet never forgetful of the people's rights; it is true, their post often compels them to excuse all faults, though guilty of none themselves; they are forced too frequently to move for money, but wish there was less occasion for it: They hate not such as differ from them in opinion, and secretly approve of the right course, which, sometimes, they must not follow; but such as have been here described, there will too often join an ignorant, mercenary, and servile crew, who like all things, and examine nothing, unanimous in evil, diligent in mischief,

chief, variable in principles; constant to flattery, talkers for liberty, but slaves to power. Such as these will, too frequently, in vitious times, mingle with the sound part of a court, stiling themselves the court party, and the Prince's only friends.

Good Kings, at all times, without any danger, may repose their intire concerns upon a House of Commons, the national interest will go on there without driving, and when difficulties arise, the ministers only make them; for when the King and people have but one interest, it goes on of its own accord, and such as pretend to be busy for the Prince in that place, are working for themselves, and not for him.

Nothing therefore can more import the Prince, than that they who will assume such a province, should be men of grave discretion, and solid judgment, wise, and not subtle, cool, temperate, steady, discerning, and patient of contradiction: and indeed, they cannot be proper for that post, unless they have in their heads an universal scheme of their own, and the business of other countries.

When giddy young men, without experience, are relied upon and trusted in this station, they embroil the Prince's affairs; by their ignorance they give his enemies advantage, and by their insolence disoblige his friends,

A man

A man can be no more born a statesman than a physician or a lawyer; and let the mind be never so happily disposed, time must ripen what is begot by nature.

Mr. Hobbes says, *He that has most experience in any kind of business, has most signs to guess at the future time; and consequently is the most prudent: And so much more prudent than he that is new in that kind of business, as not to be equalled by any advantage of natural or extemporary wit.*

The sanguine hopes conceived by young men, are by no means proper, in weighty and great deliberations, and they seldom make good statesmen: Elder years, where they produce not wisdom, bring, at least, caution, which is something like it.

They who have seen much, are used to frequent disappointments, and therefore not inclined to venture; especially they rarely hazard the sum of affairs upon any single council.

Young men are good to execute the results of elder wisdom, but the same fire which makes them best for action, renders them unfit for council: Yet there is now and then a fortunate genius, in whom the prudence of age, and the warmth of youth meet together, but of such *the examples are not common.*

Pierce



*Pierce Gaveston, Hugh Spencer, and the Duke of Buckingham*, are sufficient instances that the conduct of young ministers is seldom successful to themselves, nor to their masters : They do the less mischief if they meddle only in the pleasures of their Prince; but when warm heads, full of conceit, with slight wit, and no true wisdom, pretend to guide a whole state, and to have majority at their beck and rule, in a short time they occasion more disorders than can be remedied in many years.

When persons so described come to have a corrupt majority of their side, they diminish the nation's stock and its coin, they lose its trade, they anticipate all the Prince's revenues, they charge the subject for many years to come with a great number of new duties and impositions ; they bring the state into an immense debt, and plunge it into such difficulties, that hardly any new revenues can be well erected : But it is hoped *England* will never fall into such destructive hands.

Our wealth and greatness depend absolutely upon keeping the legislative power to future ages *untainted, vigilant* for the public safety, *jealous* of the people's rights, *watchful over the ministers*, and to have the members not awed by armies, nor to be seduced by preferments, bribes, or pensions ; that we are safe at present is granted, and  
that

that we are not now under any dangers of the like kind, and that this important post is well secured, is allowed: But writing for posterity, to which these papers may, peradventure, be transmitted, we think it needful to give these cautions.

While we preserve our constitution as we received it from our ancestors, bad men may have a short power to do mischief; however, their rage and folly will be at last corrected; but if we suffer our civil rights to be invaded, and if our ancient form of government should be lost, then ill ministers will proceed without controul; they will, in a short time, dissipate the nation's treasure, the people will have no stock for trade, they will lose their industry, they will grow inclinable to change, resty and indifferent in the cause of liberty, and, perhaps, willing to submit to any foreign force, like *Spain*, which has been both despotically and weakly governed.

Freedom and wealth proceed hand in hand together, and if one is lost, the other will not long continue; but this notion is not much regarded by those who can only be great, and have no ways of making their own fortunes, but by the destruction of their country.

For such as propose to thrive by disorder and misgovernment, have a strong interest to beggar the people; the confusion which  
public

public wants and private necessities introduce, suits best with their designs: A wealthy nation may be jealous of its rights, and watch any invasions upon its freedom, and a rich gentry may be unmanageable; and such bad men may think, that the best course to keep us humble is to make us poor.

If any should be so wicked to have thoughts of enslaving *England*, they will endeavour to mate and quell the stomachs of the common people, by reducing them to the misery and want, which decay of trade, if it ever happens, must bring upon this nation; and they will try to distress the gentry in their estates to that degree, as to make them rely upon the Court for a livelihood and subsistence: For which reasons they will wink at the loss of our foreign traffic, and, perhaps, contrive its destruction, knowing that upon the prosperity of trade, rents, and land, have for many years depended. Nor can ill ministers desire a better circumstance, than to have men of the best fortunes, reduced by their necessities, to come and cringe and sue to them for a small employment. Does not this bring all into their power? Must not such as shall have the distribution of these favours, be courted and followed by the major part of the gentry? Would not so great a capacity of helping others add to their strength, make them  
rich



rich and safe, and indeed, set them in a manner above impeachments?

If bad men should *ever* get into power, they will not only contribute to ruin our foreign trade, but they will try to impoverish the kingdom by exorbitant taxes, thereby to bring the gentry and people yet more under their subjection; they will likewise plunge their master into debts and necessities, to render their tricks and arts of more use, and to put a higher value upon the band they shall have in pay; for in former times, we have seen that when a Court wanted, they who procured money to be given, were thought to give it; by which means they obtained favour cheaply at the expence of others: And this single merit atoned for all their faults; it excused false steps and negligence, it sheltered their bribery, and covered their disability for the public service.

Besides, they will entangle their master's affairs, because a Prince that does not need money, may come not to need them, whose talents, in all likelihood, will consist in procuring taxes, not in well laying out the sums granted; therefore, a wanting state, a troubled government, and an indebted exchequer will be their region; large premiums, exorbitant interest, diverting appropriated funds, choice of funds on which to place their own money, preferring one debt

debt and postponing another, will be always good matter for ill statesmen to work upon, but afford much a better harvest when the government stands in want of money; immense sums given every year will be a brave and ample field for their avarice to range in, which would be cramped and confined, if bound within the narrow limits of what a nation may be able to pay.

Of all things, they love a long and an expensive war, and fear peace; for peace produces order, and gives the Prince leisure to enquire into the abuses of the state; it lets him into a right knowledge of persons in the kingdom, and the dregs which float upwards when the liquor is stirred, must sink to the bottom in quiet times. Peace restores liberty of speech; whereas, in war, all is silenced with the single word, *Necessity*; in peace there is no need to court factions; turbulent spirits are not so useful; thrift may be introduced, and such sudden fortunes cannot be raised out of the public. Grievances may be calmly debated, the management of the revenues inspected, the conduct of the ministers may be examined; and good laws may be proposed without the perpetual objection of, *Are ye for bringing in the French and Popery?* But War will better answer their designs, who mean to thrive by the loose administration with which war is generally accompanied, and

B who

who propose to prosper by the calamities and misery of their country.

When King *James* went away, we were reduced to what Mr. *Hobbes* calls the state of nature, the original contract being dissolved, and the ligaments broken, which held us before together: The nation was then a blank, apt to receive any impression; the old building was pulled down, and the faults in it before might have been corrected, if the architects had been skilful, and such lovers of their country as they pretended to be. Never men had such an opportunity of doing good, as they who had the chiefest hand in making the Revolution. They had a Prince willing to consent to whatever might set us upon a right foot, if they had met his design of landing here with equal virtues. The gentry and people were, at that time, newly awakened from the lethargy in which they had been for many years; they saw how narrowly religion and their liberties had escaped; their fears had made them wise and sober; their eyes were universally opened; and they were wrought up to a temper (which seldom happens in a whole nation) of being capable to receive good and honest councils. It was in their power for ever to have banished flattery and corruption from the Court, and from another place where those vices are yet more hurtful; and when they had changed persons,



fons, if they had taken care, at the same instant, to mend things, they had wrought a general reformation in our manners. It was in their hands to have given us a sound constitution; they had before them the errors of preceding reigns, by which they might have corrected their model; they should have entered upon a strict œconomy, neither plundering for themselves, nor suffering others to grow rich at the public cost. They should have been as careful in the state, as their master was active in the field; they should have begged less, and done more. They should have avoided bribery, than which nothing could be more unseemly in reformers of a state, and which was certain to keep out the best, and let the worst men into all their business. They ought to have known that a new settlement was to have been maintained by severer rules and methods than perhaps are necessary in a Court, where the Prince is born in purple. And lastly, they should have made this reflection, that more than ordinary virtue, of all kinds, was needful to answer the people's expectations, and that more than common wisdom was requisite, to maintain and justify so great a change.

The worst and most unhappy Kings that ever were would have ruled better, had it not been for the wrong suggestion and wicked incitements of the flatterers about them; but those pests and poisons of a

Court are yet more to blame, when things succeed not well with wise and virtuous Princes.

That declaration which the King sent to *England* before he came over, was the pole star by which our state pilots were to steer their course. It was well known, that to keep the same Parliament sitting so many years, was what had chiefly debauched the gentry of this kingdom; it was therefore expected, that in the act for declaring the rights and liberties of the subject, some provision should have been made against that evil for the future. Several ministers, who betrayed their King and country, have gone on to the last with impunity, by keeping Parliaments quite off; but more have found a shelter for their crimes in houses, which they have long held together, and of which they have had the handling for many sessions. Could men pretend to be patriots, and not take care of securing that post? Could our freedoms be any way certainly lost, but by laying aside the use of Parliaments, as was designed in the reign of King *Charles* the First, or by keeping them so long sitting, till a majority of members should be under engagements with the Court, as had almost happened in the reign of King *Charles* the Second? Were we not both times upon the very brink of ruin, and in hazard of being no more a free people? Did it not, therefore, import that party which had, heretofore, made

made such high professions for liberty, to provide that *England* might be no more threatened with the same danger? Should not this have been a main article in our contract with their Majesties upon their accession to the throne, who readily consented to all things that might make us safe and happy, the king having promised in his declaration, *To do all things which the two Houses of Parliament should find necessary for the peace, honour, and safety of the nation, so that there may be no more danger of the nation's falling, at any time hereafter, under arbitrary government?*

It was certainly a great omission not to bring on, in the very beginning of the revolution, the act for Triennial Parliaments, which our own corruptions produced at last; if the state had entered early into that wholesome council, it had made the King's entire reign more easy to himself, and less costly to his people. It had given a rise to that virtue and public honesty he came over to plant, and had answered all the ends of his declaration. They who were not well principled, must have pretended so to be, for the paths and road to preferment had been thereby quite altered: The ingredients which before composed a statesman, were skill to govern the House, ability now and then to make an important turn, knowledge of the members, that is, *who* were to be taken off, and *what* was their price, diligent in



keeping that band together, who were *right or wrong*, to be unanimous. They who were thus qualified themselves, or who would blindly follow the professors of these pernicious arts, engrossed the whole business and employments of the nation; but by neglecting to put matters under a good settlement in the beginning, one and the same House of Commons came to continue sitting with short intervals for six years, and this wrong measure being taken, renewed all the former errors of our constitution, and for a time restored to men the same dishonest interest they had before, and, if they were so wicked, gave them fresh opportunity and room to endeavour once more the subversion and ruin of this kingdom, not by the very ways practised in former times, but by the same corrupt inclinations and councils dressed in other shapes; and though, *without doubt*, none of them are chosen into this Parliament, yet, it is to be feared, that in those sessions of six years continuance, there was reared up a new brood of men of business, as high flatterers, more false, designing, and rapacious than their predecessors, but without the same skill and dexterity to support their malice.

But though some errors might be committed in the beginning of the revolution, it is hoped all things are now well, that peace has put an end to those disorders in government which war does commonly beget, and that our present management is not  
liable

liable to any censure. And what is said here, and what may be observed hereafter, of the like kind, in the series of this discourse, is not at all the present case of *England*; it is hoped we are not a corrupt people, but in process of time *we may grow so*, and lose that virtue which is presumed to shine in this age. *This section is, therefore, directed to posterity, which alone is concerned in the ethicks here advanced.*

In future ages, perhaps, ambitious and designing men may desire to embroil their master's affairs only, to make him more dependant upon their arts; hereafter, men of arbitrary principles may designedly neglect the concerns and care of foreign traffic, with a purpose to impoverish, and so to enslave the people; in the next age, likewise, designing ministers may take advantage of the martial temper of a Prince, and, instead of reigning in his high courage with grave councils, they may disguise from him the true state of his affairs, and push him on to a new war, without right provisions, or without making such previous leagues as may make it tolerable in the progress, or happy in the conclusion; and perhaps, they may desire the semblance of a war, only to have a pretence for a standing army.

For the benefit, therefore, of future times, it may be proper to show by what steps those vices and immoralities, that affect the public, first creep into a country, and what progress

they come afterwards to make, and to show what sort of men and what kind of councils intangle a Prince's affairs.

But though this paper be directed to posterity, and though it is nothing but a caution to future times, yet, probably, it may offend some persons who are tender in these matters.

However, we shall venture to affirm, that if this nation should ever be under any great disorder, the truest course to mend it, will be to plant in the minds of the better sort, morality, and the shame of doing ill to their country, and we shall presume to assert, that observing the rules and dictates of virtue, does not only lead to Heaven, and a blessed state hereafter, but is the best way of securing to a people in general, prosperity, peace, safety, power, and happiness in this present world.

To trace those men, who may design to change this constitution, in all their dark and crooked ways, and to follow them in all their mazes, will be difficult; however, we shall do our best to describe the persons, and to shew their councils, that they may be narrowly watched by all such as love their country.

But to do this, we must take a short view of things past, and a little consider the posture of affairs at the restoration of King *Charles II.* and how they stood during his reign, and the reign of his successor.

When



When that Prince was recalled from exile, by the voice of the whole people (who had been tired with the many changes in government, that happened from *Cromwell's* death to the year 1660) it was almost impossible, but that we should run from one to the other extreme; and it was reasonable to fear that men should readily embrace a servitude, who knew not how to make a right use of liberty. Upon which account, many have wondered, why our ancient form of government was not at that time altered, and how it came to pass we did not then embrace absolute monarchy.

But we are to consider, that King *Charles* was a young Prince, more inclined to taste the pleasures of power than willing to feel its weight; he had undergone many troubles, which he intended to recompence with great ease and luxury; so that the rugged work of subverting the laws suited neither with his age nor temper. Had he lived longer, as time and opposition began to sour his blood, what he might have attempted, is very doubtful.

Besides the unactive genius of the King, there happened then another circumstance very fortunate for *England*, which was, that the services and merit of the Chancellor *Clarendon*, and the Treasurer *Southampton*, did strongly induce him to put the administration of his affairs into their hands. They were both persons of age and experience, they had known the former reign, they had seen the grounds

grounds and rise of the civil war, they understood the nature of our constitution, they saw what had deposed one King, and found that unlimited power was hard to compass, and difficult to keep; and having their master's ear, and, at first, a large share in his affection, they kept him within bounds. The skill in the laws of one, the eloquence of the other, the general abilities of both, made them esteemed by the people, and awful to their very Prince, and this gave a weight to all their councils. They had authority enough in their persons to be listened to, when they spoke bold and necessary truths, having superior knowledge and desert too to be heard, they did not stand in need of saying always what was pleasing, which is the miserable and servile condition of upstart, weak, and obscure statesmen; but less were they obliged to flatter every flatterer. Having a foundation of merit, they scorned the mean aid of parties, or to be the wretched journeymen of any dark cabal: Knowing what was their master's and the nation's interest, and intending to promote both, they gave wholesome advice, without fear of offending either Prince or people. That kingly government was then kept within the limits of the law, that our constitution was not given up between the fears of one, and the hopes of the other party, and that our civil rights were still preserved, was chiefly owing to the wisdom, courage, and integrity of those two able statesmen.

But

But even then, and all along afterwards, there were still some among us who wanted to make their master absolute; they consisted principally of such as had large ambition, and slender merit, who are the best instruments for any tyranny. These were ever embroiling the King with his Parliament, either to protect them, or to justify some of their illegal actions. Sometimes they got him to appear a violent church-man, and, at other seasons, to favour the dissenters, but, at no time, to take care of religion itself. They persuaded him to extend the regal power in every thing; they got him to seize all the charters, in order to influence elections. By their councils he raised an army, under colour of declaring war with *France*; by their instruments they made him absolute in *Scotland*, at the same time doing what they could to weaken the Protestant interest in *Ireland*. But their chief aim was to procure him so large a standing revenue, as might make Parliaments useless for the future. It is true, they proposed this revenue for his life only; but if that first step had been made, it had not been difficult afterwards to entail it on the crown: Besides, what has been granted to one Prince, has been always continued to his successor without any struggle.

That these things were done with a design to change the constitution, is visible enough: and it is as evident, that these councils were either promoted by persons, who wanted the  
sublime



sublime part of wisdom, necessary for the conduct of great affairs, and, therefore, were to form a government that might subsist by tricks and arts, or they were forged by a set of men, whose avarice and ambition no regular establishment could satisfy; whose crimes a free state would look into, and whose arbitrary proceedings a Parliament would not suffer: They were, therefore, to build their fortunes, gratify their high desires, and find impunity, by setting up the regal power above the laws.

In the next reign, yet more open invasions were made upon our liberties, not by the same men, but by men acting upon the same principles: but they proceeded more cunningly before than afterwards: For in the former reign, it was thought best to begin by altering the constitution, and that when this was done, religion might be changed, of course: But the hot zeal of the Catholics would not permit them to go by slow and regular measures: they, therefore, made a strange and impolitic attempt, never like to succeed, which was first to convert, and then to enslave the nation.

While these matters were transacting, there appeared all along, persons, both in and out of Court, who did most virtuously oppose those designs, that, first secretly, and then openly, were forming against their country.

As some were contriving to subvert our civil rights, others did as carefully watch their preservation, which invading and defending,

fending, divided *England* into what was then called the court and country party.

Never was liberty more cunningly attacked, or more nobly protected, than in that House of Commons which sat eighteen years. It contained bold bad men, with hearts and heads fit to contrive the subversion of a state. But, there were in it also persons of another character, very great indeed, with quite superior judgments, and with minds so rightly adapted for government, that the weight of a whole empire might be safely reposed upon their shoulders, in whom conversation with the dead wisdom of past ages, was joined with experience, and a perfect knowledge of this present world. These brave spirits, from the beginning, resisted that inundation of flattery and servile compliance, with which great revolutions, in corrupt times, are certain to be attended. They vigorously opposed that unanimous band, which diligently promoted arbitrary power. Sometimes they saved us when we were within three or four votes of utter ruin; they hindered that increase of the King's revenue, which, alone, would have put an end to Parliaments. These were the prime leaders of such whom the people, for some years, were pleased to term the country party, and by good patriots, so called, our constitution was, for a while, preserved.

But after the year 1679, on both sides the minds of men grew so inflamed, and such animosities did arise between them, that they  
could

could no longer call one another by the civil appellation of court and country party, so that the different sides began to be distinguished by other sort of names.

It is, indeed, below the gravity of a sober writer to use the common cant words of the town, but it is, sometimes, unavoidable, especially when that, which was only mirth and cant at first, became, at last, a serious matter.

The accidental words of *Guelf* and *Ghibelin*, in process of time, grew to be the names of powerful parties, into which several countries were divided, and in which Emperors, Kings, Popes, and Princes engaged, and these names of distinction continued for some ages, producing wars and actions of great importance.

In the same manner the words of *Whig* and *Tory*, intended, at first, as reciprocal reproaches, in a short time, grew to be the names by which two great parties were contented to be called, and into which, in a manner, the whole nation was divided.

They were termed Whigs, and, indeed, they called themselves so, who, under another name, had, heretofore, opposed the corrupt and illegal proceedings of the Court, who foresaw the dangers that would arise from a Catholic King, who were for correcting the exorbitances of *Westminster-hall*, and for putting a stop to extravagant fines, and who made a resolute stand, and would give no more money, till the *Habeas Corpus* act was passed, and till the new raised army  
was



was disbanded; and who did their utmost against the surrender and regulating of charters.

In the next reign, the same men, or men acting upon the same principle, declared themselves against taking off the test and penal laws. They showed an open dislike in Parliament of Catholics being put into offices of trust: They abhorred the cruel executions in the West: They opposed the violent prosecution of the seven bishops: And lastly, they were ready and active with their councils and assistance, to bring over the redeemer of *England*.

A man is but young at nineteen, but a party may be thought old that is of so long a standing. The persons just now described were the *Old Whigs*, whose principles will be revered in future ages, by all such as love their country. It is true, some persons did join with these, and call themselves *Whigs*, who had all along other views than the nation's service, whom disappointments had soured, who opposed to be taken off, and who did not like a Court, because a Court did not like them. But they who swim against the tide, must make use of all helps, and in corrupt times, even the best patriots have refused no sort of men that could any ways assist the public: The good and bad of these altogether were called the *Whig Party*.

To what had been formerly stiled the Court side, the people, afterwards, gave the name of *Tories*. And we shall give an ac-

count

count of what sort of persons this party was composed. The bulk of them consisted of such as were descended from the cavaliers, whose families had suffered very much by the civil war, and who, by education, were seasoned with an early love to kingly government. They were jealous that all motions tending to preserve liberty, favoured of the commonwealth, with whose weight their fathers have been so lately crushed. A most unwise generation of men, to have any fears that a commonwealth could be restored in a country so corrupted! Many of them were much of that principle of which *Tacitus* describes *Marcellus Eprius* to have been, who said in the senate, *Se meminisse Temporum quibus natus sit, quam Civitatis formam Patres Avique; instituerint: ulteriora mirari, praesentia, sequi: bonos Imperatores voto expectere, qualescunq; tolerare.* That he was not unmindful of the times, in which he was born, nor of the form of government settled by their fathers and grandfathers; that he looked with admiration on the remoter times, still following the tide of the present day; wishing from his heart to see good Emperors, yet ready to endure the authority of any. Many of them were debauched by pomp and splendour, and in the heat of their youth, they liked the pleasures of a Court, but the riots of it compelled many of them, at last, to depend upon its favours. Others embraced the regal power more warmly, because they saw many of the opposite side bitter against the church,

not

not so desirous to correct any of its errors, as willing to lay the axe to its very root. Others linked themselves with this band out of a cautious temper, and through a fear that contending with the Court might produce another war. Some gave into this side out of gratitude to King *Charles*, and many through mere affection to his person; for without doubt, he was a most engaging Prince. Others went into it from a real conviction of their minds, that the King was not safe without more power, to which opinion they were chiefly led, by observing the rash councils, unquiet spirits, and insolent behaviour of some of their opponents. But with those who might act of this side upon a principle, there joined a great many who had no good intentions to the public, who were for enlarging the Prince's power, in order to augment their own; who were for robbing the people, that they might share in the plunder; who would have set the King above all the laws, that they might be never accountable to a Parliament for their proceedings; and, who pretending a great zeal for the church, were all the while making way for popery; thus, upon different motives, considerable numbers were listed of this side, and the good and the bad mingled together, composed what was called the *Tory party*.

But human affairs are subject to such odd turns, that in the next reign many of both these parties traversed their grounds, and mutually passed into that camp, which some of their enemies had deserted. Not a few of the Whigs  
C entered



entered into the worst of King *James*' measures and councils ; and the eyes of those who had been reckoned Tories, were, in a manner, universally opened, and they began to see the errors they had been committing so many years, insomuch, that they were as eager as any others to promote the revolution : So that the foundest part of these clashing factions shook hands together, and joined in that rescue of our liberties, which could never have been brought about, but by the concurrent endeavour of both parties.

Both sides had their faults ; and of both sides bad men were listed, and of each side there were many, who, all along, acted upon the principles of honesty and virtue, and who aimed at the common good, though as to the way to it, in their turns, each side might be now and then mistaken ; it must, indeed, be granted, that the Whigs saw the diseases that were growing upon the body politic, before the Tories, but when the distemper began to rage, the Tories were not behind hand, in seeking out the proper remedy.

But though such as the common people then called Tories, joined in the revolution, and had, without doubt, the greatest hand in it, having on their side men of fortunes, power, and figure, and the main body of the church, which will always be found the strongest interest in *England*, yet it must be confessed, that the change was made, upon the old Whig principles, of making Parliaments awful to the ministers, and of keeping the regal authority within the limits of the law, for what this nation then did,  
was

was directly opposite to the church or Tory maxims ; but when Princes quit the old rules of right government, their subjects will be apt to forget the old rules prescribed for their obedience.

It is hoped these names of distinction are now quite abolished and forgotten ; but the faction of *Guelfs* and *Ghibelins*, after having slept for some time, revived again, and continued upwards of two hundred years, even when the derivation of the words was no more remembered ; and the parties lasted so long, because the same principles upon which they had first differed, remained still deeply imprinted in their minds, and afforded continual matter for new dissention.

In the same manner, perhaps, some time hence, the names of Whig and Tory may be again renewed here, to disturb this nation's peace ; and if this should happen, *we must implore the Whigs not to forget their old principles and antient maxims.*

The Tories, by taking arms to defend their civil rights, and by joining to depose that Prince, by whom those rights were violated, have, in the most public manner in the world, renounced their doctrine of *Jus Divinum*, passive obedience, and non-resistance.

But if the Whigs should hereafter take their stations, if they should go upon that ground which the Tories have quitted, if they should enter upon just such measures, if they should pursue the same councils, if they should suffer themselves to be imbibed with Tory notions, *our constitution must be entirely lost.*

For they may undermine it without suspicion: Who will be jealous of those who have been preaching up liberty, and accusing arbitrary ministers for thirty years? Who will suspect such profest patriots? They may change the form of our government, and have the people of their side, who can have no jealousy of them; for the Whigs are the favourites of the people, as having so often preserved *England*. No person could be popular enough in *Rome* to think of subverting its constitution, in the purity of the commonwealth, but *Manlius*, who had saved the Capitol.

It will hardly be surmised, that *they* can mean to enslave us, who (by their speeches, actions, and writings) for many years, seemed rather inclined to a republic, than to despotic government. But if they should come to change their minds, *if they should throw off their former principles*, we shall be undone by the very men whom we thought our surest friends.

If old Whigs should hunt after places as much as ever the Tories did, and if like them, upon preferment, they should become quite *new men*, in voting, thinking, and speaking, in a moment making a sudden turn from the *whole* course of their former lives; if old Whigs, as the Tories did, should ever take bribes and pensions to betray their trust; if they should do any thing to break into the *Habeas Corpus* act, which is the chief guardian of our liberties; if they should oppose any good act for the frequent sitting of Parliaments,  
which



which want in the constitution produced all our former miseries ; if they should openly oppose any reasonable provision for trials in treason, the want of which has lost many a noble life ; and for which, heretofore, they had so loudly called ; if, as the Tories did, they should send their emissaries about to influence or corrupt elections ; if old Whigs, to whom *Meum* and *Tuum* was once so sacred, should come to ruin a society of trading men, and, at one blow, destroy many hundred families ; (but God forbid *Englishmen* should ever have such a thought ! ) if old Whigs shall persuade any future Prince to closet members, as was done in the preceding reigns ; if by their power they should get men turned out of employment, for pursuing the dictates of their conscience and understanding ; if, like the ministers heretofore complained of, they should have a band of pensioners ready to give up any right, to grant any sum, and to excuse, nay, even to vote their pay-master thanks for any male administration ;

If the old Whigs should restore to men the same dishonest interest they had heretofore ; if they should consume us in their ministerial, and sell us in their legislative capacity ; if they should desire to have things governed rather by tricks and little arts, than according to the direction of laws, or the bent of the people ; if they, who upon the virtuous principle of keeping *England* a free country, in former times, opposed all excises, should be brought to create so many *new offices* and *officers*, as may influence elections round the kingdom ; if they,

who heretofore thought the best way to preserve their civil rights, was to keep the purse, and to have always something to give, should be for settling such an immense revenue on the crown, as may make Parliaments unnecessary; if they who were so careful in King *Charles's* reign, not to burthen the nation with taxes, should give away the people's wealth, as if *England* were a mine of treasure never to be exhausted;

If the very men who have *Asserted and claimed it to be their true, ancient, and indubitable right, and that it ought to be esteemed, allowed, adjudged, and deemed, That the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom, in time of peace, unless it be with the consent of Parliament, is against law*; if they who once believed this eagle in the air frightened all motions towards liberty; if they who heretofore thought armies in time of peace, and our freedoms inconsistent; if the same men should throw off a Whig principle so fundamental; if they should become the open advocates for standing forces, and even submit to troops composed of foreigners.

If, in this manner, the old Whigs, whose foresight and courage has hitherto preserved *England*, should quite change their minds, and go thus retrograde from all their former speeches, actions, and councils; if they should thus come to cloath themselves with the foul, ridiculous, and detested garments of the Tories, and give into the worst of their measures; and if all that has been here discoursed, should  
happen,

happen, then would the constitution of this country be utterly subverted.

Formen, finding themselves thus forsaken by the ancient friends to liberty, would believe they were bought and sold; they would imagine that there was no such thing as virtue and honesty remaining in the kingdom; they would think all pretensions to the public good, to be nothing but designs of ambitious persons, to lift themselves up to high honours, upon the shoulders of the people; and when nations have before their eyes an armed power to fear, and none in whom they can put any trust, they seldom fail of submitting to the yoke.

Free states yield to slavery when the men best esteemed, and most in vogue, are generally thought to be corrupted. This was the condition of Rome under *Augustus*, as *Tacitus* finely describes it, *Ubi Militem donis, Populum Annonâ, Cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit; insurgere paullatim, Munia Senatus, Magistratum, legum in se trahere, nullo adversante: cum ferocissimi per acies aut proscriptione cecidissent. Ceteri Nobilium, quantò quis servitio promptior; opibus ac Honoribus extollerenter: ac novis ex rebus aucti, tuta & præsentia, quam vetera ac periculosa mallent, neque Provinciæ illum statum rerum abnuebant, suspecto Senatus populique imperio, ob certamina potentium, & avaritiam magistratum: invalido legum auxilio, quæ vi, ambitu, postremo pecunia turbabantur.* When the best and noblest spirits were all extinct, and when it was seen that the remainder were contented with wealth, titles, and preferments, the price



of their submission, the *Romans* thought it their safest course to commit all to the care and wisdom of a single person.

In the same manner, if in times to come it should happen that our nobility and gentry should be more solicitous to get a small employment, than to keep a great estate; if the persons of note and figure should be swayed by their private interest, without any regard to the public good; if it should be visible to the counties and boroughs, that men covet to be chosen, not for their country's service, but in order to serve themselves; if it should grow apparent, that neither side is at bottom better principled than the other, that court and country party, Whigs and Church-men, are nothing but the factions of those who have, and those who desire preferment; if, in this, manner, the whole mass of blood in the body politic should be corrupted, the nation will throw off that reverence to Parliaments, which has hitherto preserved our liberties, and like the neighbouring countries, either terrified or allured, they will, by degrees, submit to unlimited monarchy; and so we shall lose one of the best constitutions that was ever set afoot for the well governing a people.

Handling as we do the methods whereby a nation may increase in wealth and power, we thought it necessary to describe those parties and factions, which probably hereafter may come to influence in its councils; and this has been done in order to incite good men to watch over their growth and progress, and such good men chiefly

chiefly as design to engage on neither side, but to bend all their care that no side may be able to hurt the commonwealth.

And if it should be asked, why the care of liberty and preserving our civil rights should be so much recommended in a paper relating to trade? We answer, that herein we follow *Machiavel*, who says, *that when a free state degenerates into a tyranny, the least mischief that it can expect, is to make no farther advancement in its empire; and no farther increase either in riches or power, but for the most part it goes backward and declines.*

This deep statesman has a saying in another place well worthy of eternal remembrance, *that the Prince who aims at glory and reputation in the World, should desire a Government, where the manners of his subjects are corrupted and depraved, not to subvert and destroy it like Cæsar, but to rectify and restore it like Romulus, than which the heavens cannot confer, nor man propose to himself greater honour.*

It may be objected, that in *France*, where all thoughts of liberty are extinguished, trade and riches have of late years very much increased. But this admits of an easy answer. An absolute Prince, with great abilities and virtues, by care and wisdom may make his country flourish for a time. However, if his successors are weak or wicked, all shall be soon unravelled and go backward, and poverty shall soon invade the same people which before began to thrive; for to make a nation very rich and powerful, there must be a long succession  
of

of good Princes, (which seldom happens) or a long succession of good laws and good Government, which may be always had in countries that preserve their freedom: and without doubt it is on this account that *Machiavel* has asserted, *that no cities have augmented their revenues, or enlarged their territories, but whilst they were free and at liberty.*

And if in future times the nobility and gentry of *England* (which God forbid) should traffick the people's rights for titles, bribes, or places, *vilia Servitii pretia*, and if they should be induced fearfully, or, which is worse, corruptly, to give up this constitution, poverty will creep insensibly upon us. We shall, as *Machiavel* says, *go backwards and decline*, land will yield a great deal less than now, rents will be ill paid, and we shall not have a foreign traffic, large and extended enough to produce such a naval strength as may make us safe at home, and terrible abroad.

It is therefore upon the authority of this great man that we have laid down, *that a country cannot increase in wealth and power but by private men doing their duty to the public, and but by a steady course of honesty and wisdom, in such as are trusted with the administration.*

However, if things should hereafter proceed amiss, it is hoped the strong constitution of this Government will in time throw off those diseases which may affect it for a season, and that the united wisdom of the nation can recover us from that decay of health to which we may be reduced by a few empiricks of  
state;



state; their giddy management for a while may be supported, and borne out, by the great riches which peradventure may have been collected here by the industry and prudence of former ages; but if what has been gathering seven centuries, they should squander away in a few years, the cries of that people whom they so impoverish, will at last awaken the Parliament to enquire into, and animadvert upon their *wild* proceedings.

If the wealth and power of a country depend upon the good Government and stability of its affairs, it must certainly import all the different ranks of men to contribute their utmost, that things may be well administered: and in mixed constitutions almost every man is able in some degree to help towards this; for *if the people are honest and careful in the choice of their representatives, and if those representatives perform their duty*, arbitrary power can never be settled here, and no male administration that may hereafter happen can long continue.

That we are in no danger at present, and that matters proceed well, now is allowed; but for the security of future times it may not be amiss frequently to repeat this caution, that our whole depends upon keeping one post well defended.

The public virtue which must preserve a state is *a constant and perpetual will to do our country good*; and where this principle governs, though in the minds of but a few, yet if they persevere with undaunted courage, the small  
num.

number may prevail at last to defeat the malice of the corrupt part, especially when the endeavours of the few are assisted by a Prince disposed by interest and inclination to promote the common welfare.

If good men were but as active and vigilant as their opposites, it would not be so easy a matter to change the constitution of a country: when those who are concerned in honour and interest to have things well administered, do resolutely and firmly join together to oppose such as find their profit by a corrupt and loose administration, a stand may at least be made, and some stop put to the further progress of the evil.

But though *Pompey*, *Cæsar* and *Crassus* composed a fatal triumvirate, and united in a strict league to subvert the liberties of *Rome*, we do not read that there was the same union and good understanding between *Lucullus*, *Cato*, *Cicero*, and the rest, who endeavoured to save the commonwealth, for the luxury and laziness of some, the froward temper, or secret ambition of others, made them either neglect or obstruct the business of the public, which might be the reason that *Cæsar* at last prevailed.

In the same manner, if hereafter a cabal of men, in order to their own greatness, should design to change this constitution, to introduce a Government by the sword, and to give away all the nation's wealth; and if to these ends they should form assemblies, and there propose what they intend to consent to in another place, they

they will succeed, and their attempts can never be withstood, unless such, as mean *England* well, join in as firm a league for its preservation, as they shall enter into for its destruction.

If, therefore, in future times, it shall be visible that some men, to build their own fortunes, are pushing at their country's ruin, good patriots must then exert all their virtue; they must re-assume the courage of their ancestors; they must lay aside their pleasures; but, chiefly, they must sacrifice to the public all their ancient animosities; they must mutually forgive one another; it must be no more remembered of what party the man was, it being sufficient to enquire, whether or no he always acted upon the principles of honesty and honour. At such a time, the best men of both sides, if the name of parties shall still remain, must shake hands together, with a resolution to withstand the unanimous, subtle, and diligent enemies of the King and kingdom.

In such a juncture both sides must contend, not which shall flatter highest, but which shall best contribute to the defence of their Prince's person, and to the maintenance of the established government.

If bad men shall have meetings to consult how they may destroy our civil rights, good patriots ought to meet calmly to communicate councils which way those rights are to be preserved; for *Machiavel* says, *There is not a better or more secure way to suppress the insolence, or cross-bite the designs of an ambitious citizen, than*



*than to take the same way to prevent, which he takes to advance them.*

In such a juncture, not only the best of all parties must be taken in, but we must be angry with no sort of men that are willing to unite against the enemies of *England*, for in a nation, which, for a long time was, as all allow, upon a dishonest interest, it will be difficult to find persons whose characters shall be intirely without a blemish; nor, indeed, was there ever any man perfect; at such a season, therefore, men must place their hopes in such as have most abilities, and fewest faults, especially when they live in the dregs of *Romulus*, and not in the republic of *Plato's* institution.

If the nobility and gentry retain their wonted courage, and preserve their former wisdom, they will always rescue us out of weak and polluted hands, and will never endure that so noble a Prince as we have now upon the throne, esteemed by the whole world, and head of the protestant interest, should, at any time, be distressed at home, or interrupted abroad, in the measures his high valour purposes for the good of *Europe*, by the *ill conduct* of any minister.

Particular men do often miscarry in the world, notwithstanding, that in their whole transactions they give continued proofs of a most perfect conduct, they shall not be the richer for their thrift, nor better esteemed for their integrity: Their industry shall avail them nothing: Their courage shall never bring them victory, and their wisest councils shall have

no success. Others, in the mean time, every way deficient, of no desert, and merely by the help of fortune, shall succeed in all they undertake. But though she may be said to govern thus in single events, and here and there to influence in the actions of private persons, great monarchies and commonwealths do not depend upon her politic institutions, prudently ordered in the beginning, and keeping on in a steady course of wisdom and virtue, are out of her power and rule, and can never fail to prosper; and when disasters happen to a state, it is *seldom* the work of chance, but rather the *effect* of some misgovernment.

For in former reigns we have seen, that when the King's revenue was not well managed, it proceeded from this, that the employments relating to it were not the rewards of skill, but the recompence of another merit, and that want of knowledge in the managers was winked at, while they were giving money in another place. Heretofore, if men betrayed their trust and sold the people, it was because they were largely invited to it. In former times, when the nation's trade impaired and went backward, the secret cause was, that the ministers were servilely to promote the interest of some other country. And in the preceding reigns, if the King's treasure was wildly dissipated, and if exorbitant grants were made, it came from this, that the ministers could refuse nobody, having a great deal to ask for themselves; and that they were not to put rubs in the way of others, that they might more smoothly

smoothly carry on their own pretensions. These instances are only given, not but that by many others we could support this position, that when the public treasure is wasted, when a nation runs into immense debts, when the land of the crown is granted all away, when its revenues are ill managed, and when the people are corrupted, we are not altogether to blame fortune, the times or accidents of the war, but rather to attribute a great share of these evils to some error in the subordinate parts of the administration.

*Tiberius*, in a letter to the Senate, has this expression, *Nescio an Suasurus fuerim omittere potius prævalida & adulta vitia, quam hoc adsequi, ut palam fieret quibus flagitiis impares essemus.* The scope of his epistle is to show how difficult it was for him to correct vices, with which the principal men of *Rome* were tainted, and that by the attempt he might draw envy upon himself. But though a cautious Prince might have reason to entertain such a fear, the whole legislative power of a country need never lie under apprehensions of the like nature. This strength can deal with the ambition, avarice, corruption, and rapine of the great ones: The legislative authority can correct men of arbitrary principles, and pull down the topping pride of insolent and undertaking ministers, who are, by no means, equal to their business, and whose heads are giddy, and turn round in the eminence, on which fortune, flattery, and their other vices, not their merit, has placed them.

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And if our affairs here should ever happen to light into such hands, we must put our chief hopes in the King at the head of a Parliament.

While that place contains men of courage and public spirit, matters cannot long proceed amiss. Whoever therefore undertakes that trust, should continually have before their eyes how much the common welfare depends upon their virtues. But above all things, they should have disinterested and self-denying minds.

It can hardly be conceived, but by those who have seen it, what reverence is paid, even by his enemies, to a man of steady principles, the tenor of whose words and actions are always the same; who is neither to be bought nor frightened: he is admired and followed; all he says has its due weight; his honest hoary head is dear to all mankind. Whereas the whiffling prolers after places, and little busy intriguers, are contemptible to the very men, of whom they are the wretched instruments. And let the ambitious think, what they please, that man has most real power in this country, who is believed to be of the most unshaken integrity towards the public, and he who has such a character enjoys more true greatness than all the vain pomp and honours a Court can give.

The employments of *England* are yet but few, and their profits but inconsiderable to what they are in several nations; however small as they seem to be, it is to be feared that

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some time or other they will be made the engines wherewith bad men will endeavour to subvert this constitution.

It is true, at present we are out of such a danger; but if in future times we should chance to see all employments reserved for men in one certain station; if the road to preferment should lie but through one place and passage; when this happens, we shall have cause to be alarmed, and to look about us.

They who feel within themselves abilities to serve the public, are by no means blameable in desiring to be upon the stage of business. On the contrary, that four philosophy which makes some persons at all seasons retire and abandon the state, is by no means to be commended. They do indeed but *Nomine Magnifico, Segne otium velare*: If the posture of affairs will possibly admit it, good men should rather strive to be in power, that the commonwealth may not be ingrossed by corrupt and unskilful hands. A wise man can easily discern whether the ministers are such, that he may with honour and safety mix in councils with them. If the administration be sound and right, or if it has but a face looking that way, it is a proper season for men of probity, skill, and virtue, to produce their talents, and to push themselves forward, in order more fully to mend things. And at such a time, they should be ready to assist the state with their true sense and their right understanding; nor should they lazily suffer the perfections of their minds to be useless and unactive. And if among those  
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there be any very eminent, strong in friends, versed in affairs of state, of a deep reach and foresight, who have eloquence to sway assemblies, and courage to resist and overcome popular fury, such ought not to despair of the public; but assist with their wisdom to redeem a people from their weak hands, who shall get into power by meer chance, when the nation perhaps has been in a high ferment, as in boiling liquors the scum will get uppermost. And there is such reverence paid to those who have a very great genius, that when they offer themselves to serve the commonwealth, the weight of the people will bear down all the upstart pretenders, and force them to give way, and make room for merit so superior.

But if it should ever happen that the administration should be intirely bad and wrong, then ought good men to have no share nor hand in it; they should withdraw from any participation in the negligence or guilt; they should quit what they cannot honourably hold; they should concern themselves no more in business, leaving such ministers to govern by themselves, who will not govern well, and be contented to serve their country by defending liberty in *one post* against any incroachment; they should not make so ill a use of that affection the people may bear them, and of the interest they may have in the nation, as to be a shelter for the crimes or folly of others; nor should they as it were lend their countenance, and be the screen behind which bad men may safely attempt to undermine the constitution.



If the times are good, silent merit will be sought after; but if they are bad, ill men will be lifted up to the offices and dignities of the state by the applause of their adherents, and the faction of their friends; but at such a season it is no shame not to be employed; *Tacitus* speaking of *Ælius Lanira*, says, *Et non permissa Provincia Dignationem addiderat.*

Great men are often liable to one unfortunate vanity: they believe their parts, dexterity and wisdom, to be such, that they can mend things, give them a new complexion, correct all errors, and at least that they shall preserve themselves sound, though every one else be tainted; and upon these presumptions, some of the men in best esteem have heretofore engaged with a foul and depraved ministry; but we could never see, that they were able to make any converts: on the contrary, instead of changing the Court, the Court did alter them.

Courts are but slowly mended, and that not by the authority or example of any single person, except it be of the Prince himself, strongly bent to set matters upon a right foot; and yet we have more instances of Courts which have spoilt their Prince, than of Princes that have reformed their Courts.

And if it be asked, when is the most proper time for persons of probity and virtue to undertake the management of affairs, it may be answered, it is then seasonable when things call loudly to be mended, when unskilful pilots have run the ship aground, so that she sticks fast, ready to split at the next coming of the waves,

waves, when ignorant men are quite bewildered in their errors, when the whole people see and feel the effect of ill Government, when the Prince grows ashamed of those whom his subjects hate and fear, when the commonwealth cannot emerge out of its debts and difficulties, without help from abler hands: then is the true time for the best men to offer themselves to the service of their country. At such a season, honesty will not stand alone, weak, defenceless, and out of countenance at the sight of prosperous vice. Nor can Courts be ever safe for honest men, till the circumstance and necessity of the times bring thither a party strong enough to maintain itself against those, who are grown great by wicked arts.

If *English* men will be continent in this single point, all must of course go well; if they who have noble commands in the country will scorn meanly to depend in town; if they who have brave seats of their own will despise the crowded antichambers of the great ones here; if they who have plentiful estates, will slight a troublesome and precarious employment, they are more happy than a Court can make them: if our nobility and gentry would consider how miserable the noblemen of *France* are with all their mighty places, they would at no time hereafter desire to wear the livery of bondage. And if they are truly seasoned with these notions, that their liberties are above all price, and (as Sir *Benjamin Rudiard* was wont to say) *that there is nothing worth being a knave for*, the head must be very skilful, and the heart

very bold, that will undertake to inflave our fundamental rights.

It is true, what has been here advanced, and what shall be said anon, may seem needless at present, when all things are presumed to go well, but these notions may be of use to after ages.

*The duty which private persons owe to the public*, lies in a very narrow compass, and when that is thoroughly performed, a country seldom fails to see *a steady course of wisdom and honesty in such as are trusted with the administration*. This duty may chiefly consist in the following particulars.

1st, That such as represent the people, be uncorrupt, unbiassed, and disinterested.

2dly, That they diligently attend the nation's service,

3dly, That they carefully watch any innovation or incroachments upon the constitution.

4thly, That they make provision against future evils.

5thly, That they look narrowly into the income and expence of the kingdom, and examine which way immense debts have been contracted, and how that money has been disposed of, which the nation has already granted.

6thly, That they hold a strong hand over the men of business, calling those to an account, who, either through folly, or upon some wicked design, pursue destructive measures.

1st, *That such as represent the people be uncorrupt, unbiassed, and disinterested*. This point we have handled sufficiently in the series of  
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this discourse. And to what has been already said upon that subject, we shall now only add, that *Rome* was once free, that *France* heretofore had the three estates, which were the guardians of its liberty; that *Spain* had formerly many rights and privileges, of which nothing now but the shadow remains; that *Denmark* and *Sweden* had once constitutions something like that of *England*; and that all these countries have been enslaved by their own corruptions.

2dly, *That they diligently attend the nation's service.* For otherwise they do not discharge the trust to which they are chosen. It has been formerly a matter of great wonder, that gentlemen should even waste their fortunes to be elected, and yet afterwards never mind that station which they seemed before so vehemently to covet. *Cato* had many virtues too big for practice, but he may be easily imitated in one good quality he had, of never failing to be present in the senate. Such should give way to others, and make room for men of more leisure, who cannot afford to employ all their time in the service of their country. But above all others, they are to blame, who can be drawn from their duty by luxury, laziness, and pleasures. Liberty can be hardly wounded in a full house; the attempts made upon it in former reigns were made when such as had no dependance upon the Court were absent about their country business. The ill ministers of those days took that opportunity to promote taxes, which would never pass in a full assembly, to pass dangerous laws, to set afoot new-

invented corporations, which may be fatal in their consequences, and to form projects either destructive to the nation in general, or ruinous to particular men. All the ill things ever done have been compassed when the negligence of some had made one side strong, and the other weak.

And if in after ages any of the men of business should be so wicked as to proceed by the same councils, and to go by the like measures, they will promote their dark designs in some such juncture, when the best patriots shall be gone away quite tired out by sessions artificially prolonged.

But it is the duty of all who love *England* to defeat, by unwearied patience, such a conspiracy against the people; and to obviate such a mischief, if the ordinary rules cannot do it, extraordinary laws may be thought on to oblige the members to that attendance, which they owe their country.

He who does not attend, injures the borough for which he serves; for it may so happen, that in his absence a thing may pass to their ruin who have sent him, and which his presence might have prevented; his electors therefore seem to have such a right to his service, as in reason no others ought to dispence with, without their consent.

Deserting in this manner the public is a growing evil, upon which account it ought to have a timely remedy. Perhaps it might not be amiss if a bill were brought in to make it highly penal for any member to be absent from  
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the house above fourteen days, without express leave first had under the seal of the borough for which he serves.

A great many mischiefs, both public and private, would be prevented, if such as represent their country would be strict in this duty of attending.

3dly, *That they carefully watch an innovation or incroachments upon the constitution.* There is nothing lulls a people more asleep than the reign of a good Prince, revered for his wisdom, feared for his high courage, beloved for his lenity, and admired for a number of other virtues; whereas under a bad reign, the subjects are jealous and vigilant, though often to little purpose. However, it is agreed on by all writers, that the mild rule of *Augustus*, contributed more to confirm the slavery of *Rome*, than all the severity and cunning of *Tiberius*.

The best times likewise produce the worst precedents; for in good times the people let many things slip, being then at their ease, not suspicious, and consequently not watchful over the Government; but where this supine temper prevails, mixed Governments decline immediately into absolute power. The frequent contests that were of old between the senate and people of *Rome* without doubt preserved their freedom; for where all are of one mind, ill use may be made of that unanimity, by some eloquent, subtle, and ambitious man, who may turn and rule it as he pleases. Therefore, to preserve constitutions that have a mixture in them of popular Government, it is necessary



cessary there should be always some small division, just enough to keep the minds of men awake, that they may observe what advantages one part of the state gets over the other.

Bad Kings provoke enough to look into their actions, but when the people have a good Prince, they give a favourable interpretation to all he does.

And the best man that ever reigned may be ill served. It is a maxim of our law, *that the King can do no wrong, but if any ill be committed in matters of state, the council; if in matters of justice, the judges must answer for it.* But though the laws exempt our Kings from blame, they are not freed from the bad effects of ill conduct in their ministers.

He therefore who represents his country, cannot do the nation nor his Prince better service, than to see that those who sit at helm, do not run the ship upon dangerous rocks. Absolute dominion is a bait with which the greatest minds may be tempted; for they whose goodness is unlimited, may desire that their power should be so too. But no one man ought to think of being omnipotent, unless he could be omniscient and omnipresent. Besides, though Princes may desire great power, that they may be able to do great good, such as serve them rarely proceed upon this principle. They often desire their masters should be arbitrary, in order to their own impunity, and to build a large fortune for themselves, for which reason they should be watched in all their

their windings, and followed in all their dark and subtle mazes.

It seldom happens that the liberties of a country are invaded all at once; the steps of power are leisurely and slow; ministers who have it in their thoughts to change the nature of a government, go to work by degrees. At first they make use of the most popular hands they can possibly procure, ordering it so, that the people may not perceive who it is that puts their fetters on; but these popular men they shove out at the first convenient season, that all may be of a piece. Their next business is to corrupt such persons as have the clearest fame, whom they discard when sufficiently tainted, and this they do that the people may think all mankind alike, which naturally drives them to follow those only who are in power, and who can do them good. Afterwards, they get from the nation all the money they can, the collecting of which erects new employments, and creates them a number of dependants, who, in one certain place, are their chief strength and best support: by the distribution of these sums, they likewise make more friends. But being never out of fear of accounting for all at last, their principal aim is to procure their master such a standing revenue, as may make him subsist without the people's help. If they find this impossible, or difficult, then, by accusations, by exorbitant proceedings without any precedent, and by harassing private persons, either in their fame or  
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fortune, they endeavour to make all the different ranks of the people, out of love with their ancient constitution.

But when they have done all this, they will not yet think themselves quite out of danger: *Senatus & Populus nunquam obscura Nomina, etsi Aliquando obumbrenter.* They will still lie under apprehensions of being reached at last by the guardians of liberty. Therefore to damp all thoughts of freedom, to influence the better sort, and to awe the vulgar, their last work is to procure a standing army.

By manifest original contract, an armed force cannot be raised nor kept within this kingdom, without consent of Parliament, so that if hereafter we should be ever enslaved that way, it is our own proper fault.

Where armies are powerful, there grows a necessity upon Princes, rather to please them than the people. And yet no mercenaries are sufficient to help a Prince against a powerful foreign force, if the subjects are disobliged at home. *Machiavel says, that a Prince who founds the duration of his Government upon Mercenary Troops, shall never be firm nor secure.* But he counts foreign forces yet more dangerous, because *they are always unanimous, and at the command of other people.*

If hereafter any ministers should be so wicked, to attempt the subversion of our fundamental rights, we have here shown some of the steps, which they will probably make to compass their designs. It therefore imports all  
good



good men, to watch their first invasions and incroachments, and betimes to intercept them in their course.

*Fourthly, that they make provision against future evils.* The virtues requisite for such as will handle matters of Government, have their foundation in wisdom and courage. He, whose endowments of the mind, are not sufficient to foresee, *a long while before*, what may be the event of a council, cannot consult safely for his Prince; and he who at every turn is afraid of popular anger, shall never give any sound advice.

Virtue and wisdom in some sense, are terms synonymous, and different words, signifying the same thing; for no man can be virtuous with any effect conducive to the public good, without a rich talent of the mind, and strong wisdom; nor can a man be truly wise, without such public virtue, as warmly embraces the liberty, honour, and interest of his country. And when a genius of this kind appears in any nation, he has a natural right to the offices and dignities of the state: but if ever Courts should happen to be depraved, they will like quite another sort of men: wanting true wisdom, they must set up something in the room of it; that is to say, momentary shifts, and short remedies; raw and unskilful medlers in business, are their darlings, that will venture at all, and yet know nothing; upon which principle they make open war with desert of any kind, and reckon

reckon it a great conquest, when they can get rid of a wary and knowing statesman.

They count it supreme wisdom to answer any single necessity, never regarding whether the manner of doing it be safe, just, or honourable. They not only trust providence, (as all men should do) but are content to rest wholly upon it; believing foresight, and thoughts of the future, to bring more anxiety than profit. They are wise, as some men subsist from hand to mouth; they think it sufficient to live to Day, and to make provision for the present moment. All this perhaps may be good philosophy in private cases; but for the whole body of a state to go by such rules, must needs be very dangerous.

If we should ever fall into such bad hands, they will not care with what debts and payments they load future times, so they may come at a little ready money. They will give large *premiums* and interest, never considering who must pay the reckoning at last. They will set afoot high duties, never weighing how the people's trade and manufactures are thereby affected. They will not mind how profusely they waste the nation's treasure; negligence and prodigality, being pleasant and easy for the present time, though afterwards the parents of infinite care and trouble.

Constancy in denying unreasonable suits, thrift for the public, promoting foreign traffick, improving the revenues granted, keeping the ships of war in good repair, laying up  
stores,

stores, making schemes for better Government, retrenching all needless expences, providing against wars to come, making good leagues abroad, allaying heats and animosities at home, and putting impediments in the way of any power that grows too fast, are so many seeds which great and able statesmen are always sowing, without a prospect to reap in many years, but the harvest comes at last; and under the conduct of such ministers; nations thrive and flourish: whereas, such as proceed upon that narrow notion of *enjoying the present benefits of time*; though they may thereby do their own work, and make their own fortunes, yet without doubt, they will ruin whatever Government they undertake to guide.

If in after ages, they who are trusted with the administration here, should be thus careless and unforeseeing, it will be the duty of such as represent the people, by frequent and serious inquiries into the state of the nation, and by plain speeches, to rouse up the men of business from a lethargy, that may prove so fatal; for undoubtedly, any part of the legislative authority may call upon the executive power, to make provision against future evils.

*Fifthly, that they look narrowly into the income and expence of the kingdom, and examine which way immense debts have been contracted, and how that money has been disposed of, which the nation has already granted.*

The last duke of *Buckingham* had many designs to put the affairs of his estate in order; and



and to this end he consulted several sorts of men: his wife and true friends laid before him, that no ways would be so effectual, as to look into his accounts, to employ honest stewards, and to live within compass. But there was another set of people, in whom he more delighted, who made him believe they would put his business into such a posture, that no negligence, nor no profusion should do him any hurt. In short, they told him directly, that they would procure for him the *philosopher's stone*. He hearkened to them, minded none of his affairs, he let his servants do what they pleased, and would put no limits to his expences. But the consequence and conclusion of all was, that his grace's evil counsellors became rich, and he grew poor.

In the same manner, if in some future reign we should fall into the hands of bad ministers, they will tell the Prince, that they can get for him the *Magisterium* (and, indeed, it would prove a kind of philosopher's stone, if they can so concert matters, as to obtain all the supplies they shall insist on) they will persuade him they can maintain his crown and dignity out of a mine of new projects, never to be exhausted, and upon this view they will advise him, first, to give *them* very large sums to buy limbecks, crucibles, and charcoal; for utensils must be had, and *workmen* must be paid; they will promote the making exorbitant grants, and giving away the crown lands upon this notion, that it is sowing a little to reap much. They will conceal pernicious pensions under  
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the dark veil of *secret service*: an article that hides all. But *the estimates of the charge of the war will be the best shelter they can possibly have for their profusions of any kind, where they can insert items never to be disproved, and never to be understood.* Finding how much it turns to their own account to have an ample revenue to range in, they will persuade their Prince to ask all things, and to spare nothing: And if such bad men as have been here described, should ever come to be trusted, they will make the body politic faint and look pale with continual opening of its veins; they will leave the crown bare, the Exchequer empty, and all the revenues anticipated; they will distress the gentry, and beggar the common people; and having thus enriched themselves, and impoverished all other degrees of men, they will reduce the nation to be naked and defenceless, hardly able to support itself at home, much less in a condition to undergo another foreign war.

If at any time hereafter, such men as have been here painted out, should be suffered to entangle our matters, to dissipate our treasure, and to waste the commonwealth, where will be the money, the fleet, and arms that may be necessary, in case the French should ever break the peace, and attempt to possess themselves of *Spain and the West Indies?*

If by the giddy, or rather frantic conduct of beardless politicians, lifted perhaps up from the meanest obscurity, and set in a manner to hold the reins, our affairs should hereafter be brought so low, (which God forbid) as that

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we must sit still, while those dominions fall into a power already but too dreadful, how can universal monarchy be avoided? And if *Spain* should happen to be thus lost, we are not only hurt in a point of empire, the most important of all, but the whole trade of *England* will be cut up by the very roots.

It may be laid down for a certain truth, that no man of a great fortune was ever undone in a few years; but he was cheated of much more than he was able to spend: and this is yet more true, if the man had parts, and a good understanding. Private men are ruined, when those about them are unfaithful, and are to profit by their destruction; and if they have no trusty servant, that will put them in mind of their condition.

The same holds in the affairs of a whole nation. When a public, that was once clear and easy, is overwhelmed with debts; when this happens among a people that have been always willing to give, and in a ministry that has never been backward to ask, when all occasions have been supplied to their full demand, when the Prince is wise, and without any expensive pleasures; when such a country does labour under difficulties almost insuperable, and when in some future reign all this shall be our case, mankind will entertain an opinion that the administration is not right; the world will be inclined to think, that such as shall then govern in the revenue, want either fidelity or skill; it will be thought that they



they have not at any time laid before their master a true state of his affairs; it will be believed that they have never contrived his expences with care and wisdom, and that they have not endeavoured by grave and wholesome councils to moderate his bounties.

The liberality of a Prince, the most extended we can imagine, will yet oblige but a very few; and to give it a constant supply, vast numbers must be harrassed. Besides, among the vulgar, frugality in a Court does, in some measure, commute for high taxes. Liberality is noble in rich and quiet times, but it will hardly be thought just, when what is given is to be, in a manner, the last drop of blood in the subject's vein. Not to value their treasure has been always the fault of great and heroic minds, of which many had been ruined every moment, but that they had grave and honest ministers ready to keep them within bounds by wholesome advices, rugged truths, and severe virtue. And so the Duke of *Sully* proceeded with his master, *Harry the IVth*. When a Prince is in his nature too bountiful, it is a duty incumbent upon such as serve him, with all humility to beg, that in his high wisdom he would consider how hardly *that* is gathered, which they shall see so lightly given: they ought rather to quit their posts, than to sign or fix the seal to immoderate gifts. But those hands must be very clean themselves, which are held up to Kings, with humble prayers, that they would have compassion on their people.

It is true, war is a devouring monster, and to feed it will very much disorder the revenues of a country: And yet, we see *France* has been able for nine years to engage all the strongest part of *Europe*, to have, all the while, land armies, consisting of above three hundred thousand men, and to maintain a fleet as numerous, and more expensive than that of *England*: And, after all this, they have been in a condition to make larger expences, of all kinds (as is said) than in any two years during the war; and we see them now in a posture to meditate higher designs than ever. That they did bear up so long against the *confederate strength*, that they have been able annually to expend such an immense treasure for upward now of ten years, and that they are not at present quite exhausted and impoverished, must, without doubt, proceed from the good conduct of those to whom the management of their affairs has been intrusted. No man is indured under that monarchy to perform the functions and offices of the state in an ignorant and careless manner. The ministers there are more frugal for their master than in their own concerns; they do not make too much haste to be rich; they are contented that a great fortune should be the recompence of many services, and of long merit. They have not let the crown lands of *France* be as it were a derelict, *Et primi Occupantis*: we do not observe it has been so ordered in that kingdom, that both the body of the people and the public too, are poor at one and the same instant; their ministers have not  
suffered.

suffered the commonwealth to be consumed by usurious contracts with the common lenders; and by their care and wisdom they have obtained such credit, even under a despotic power, that they have not been forced all along to pay above 7 *per cent.* interest for money lent the king; whereas 40 *per cent.* has been paid for mighty sums in one free Government: so that upon the whole matter, it is evident enough, that *this devouring monster war is to be fed* where the men of business are honest, foreseeing, and frugal for the state.

Mixed Governments, among many other excellencies, have this advantage, that a good administration may be obtained by any one part of the constitution, that will set itself strongly to so good a work; Kings can at all times set things right, if the business of their wars do not compel them to be often absent. Either of the houses, when they have set themselves *to inquire into*, and correct disorders, have been terrible to the most bold, subtle, and most powerful statesmen, that ever went about to undo a people, or to mislead a Prince.

If in any future reign, the treasure of this kingdom should be mismanaged, and profusely wasted; and if debts, hardly to be waded through, should be contracted; the representatives of the people may, by looking strictly into all these matters, perhaps immediately lessen the public engagements, at least they may put some stop to the farther progress of the mischief.



In such a juncture, good men will think it their duty, to see whether this debt is not to be lessened, by reviewing former accounts; they will examine, whether the sums already granted were not sufficient to pay off all the forces we have had at land and sea: they will inquire from whence such a high article of arrears proceeds: they will see how so many funds come to be deficient, and whether such deficiencies have not been occasioned by some ill conduct in those, who have managed the respective branches: they will inform themselves, *which way the many millions are gone, which the people have paid*: they will desire to know, what necessities could compel the men of business to give such large *premiums*, and high interest; and whether the promoters of a council so pernicious, did not lend their own money; and whether they have not been parties deeply concerned themselves in all usurious contracts: they will inquire upon what consideration, and for what services, immoderate grants of lands and money have been made, and they will do it the more strictly; if, when such grants were passed, it should happen that the nation was indebted, and paid heavy taxes.

The representatives of the people can look into all these things; and, no doubt, it is a duty which they owe their country, that has trusted them with so unlimited a disposal of their fortunes.

To prevent mismanagement in the revenue of this kingdom, it seems necessary that a law  
should

should be made, to put the Lords of the Treasury under such an oath, as the Lord High Treasurer of *England* takes; for it appears an absurdity in our Government, that the meanest officer concerned in the King's revenue, should be sworn to a true and faithful discharge of his trust; and the Treasury, who are trusted with the whole, whose authority is so boundless, and who have it so much in their power to hurt the nation, should be under no oath at all. Some objections there are against this; but he who considers them well, will find them of no weight, and that those necessities which have broken into, and over-ruled the ancient course of the Exchequer, might have been avoided by care and conduct.

If in future times *England* should have any grounds to doubt, that the treasure of the public has been imbezzled; if prodigious fortunes, raised in ten years by obscure men, who have had no dealings but with the Court, should minister occasion of suspicion; if resumptions should be thought fit, we mean in cases where persons of no merit have been enriched with the kingdom's spoils; if it should be thought reasonable to see whether any thing is to be saved in an immense debt, out of the unwarrantable gains which the lenders have made; if it should be judged expedient to inquire into any male administration in those through whose hands the revenue passes; if it should be deemed necessary thrift to look into all pensions; if it should be thought reasonable fairly

and impartially to state the account of so many millions given and expended, so great and difficult a work as a strict enquiry into all these matters will prove, cannot be entered upon, and brought to a good conclusion, but by the united wisdom of the nation.

No other power can face that strong league, which will be made between fellow criminals, to save one another. Ordinary remedies prevail but little against stubborn and inveterate diseases: if therefore our affairs should be ever in disorder, the legislative authority can bring the most effectual helps to set us right.

And in such a case peradventure, it may be thought advisable to promote a bill, that such sort of abuses as have been here described, and all other male-administration of the like kind, may be inquired into by committees of both Houses, to sit in the interval of Parliament, with all requisite powers, without salaries, and to be chosen by ballot. And supposing past errors to be too big for correction, yet so awful an authority, and the fear that it will from time to time be renewed, may, for the future, be some check to the growing corruptions of the age.

All the premises considered, we submit it to better judgments, whether it is not the duty of such as represent their country, *to look narrowly into the income and expence of the kingdom, and to examine which way immense debts have been contracted, and how that money has been*



been disposed of which the nation has already granted.

Sixthly, That they should hold a stronghand over the men of business, calling those to an account, who either through folly, or upon some wicked design, pursue destructive measures. Helvidius Priscus, after the example of his father-in-law, Pætus Thrasea, in the philosophy he made use of to fit himself for the service of his commonwealth, followed the opinion of the stoic, who placed all good and evil in honesty or dishonesty, accounting the gifts of fortune, such as high birth, power and wealth, to be but things indifferent towards the constituting of happiness, which they define to be internal only in the mind.

But though Aristides, Socrates, Phocion, Publicola, Cincinnatus, Attilius Regulus, and many others, have been great men under a constant and willing poverty; yet, without doubt, nobility and riches help good spirits on of their way, and set them forward: he that is high born, his perfections may be sooner taken notice of, as standing upon an eminence; and he that has wealth need not be troubled with private and domestic cares; and may devote all his time and thoughts to the service of his country.

Machiavel says, that a Prince, who intends to invade the constitution of a free people, takes this course: *to subvert all, to turn every thing topsy turvy, and make all things new. To alter the magistracy, create new titles, elect new*  
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*persons, confer new authorities, advance the poor, and impoverish the rich. That what is said of David, may be said of him: he filled the hungry with good things, and the rich he has sent empty away. Besides, it is his interest to build new cities, to shift the inhabitants from one place to another; in a word, so to toss and transpose every thing, that there be no honour, wealth, nor preferment in the whole province, but what is ownable to him.*

Some of these courses were taken by *Harry the III<sup>d</sup>. in France*; but his chief aim was to introduce new persons into such offices and dignities of the state, as were filled before with the nobility and Princes of the blood. He raised out of the dust obscure persons, who might owe to him only their wealth and honour, and who might look upon him as their second creator: these paid him a blind obedience; they never considered what was for the public good, what was reasonable, safe, expedient, just, or honest, but in all things did as they were commanded; with such a set of men this dark Prince gave the first mortal wound to the liberties of *France*; he placed them so high as to overlook the old gentry, who being weakened and depressed, had neither the interest nor the courage to preserve their ancient form of Government.

He has been followed in these steps by all the French Kings his successors; so that under that monarchy, in every reign since, we have hardly seen any but the creatures meerly of the Prince's favour, and quite new men upon the  
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stage of business, and such have in a manner ingrossed all the employments of profit, trust, and honour.

We grant that in a well constituted Government, which is upon a right foot indeed, neither wealth nor titles, and nothing but virtue and abilities, should prefer a man to the honours and employments of his country. But when the times are too corrupt to admit of such measures, the question will be, who with most safety are to be relied on, they whose fortunes are made, or they who are to make their fortunes? they who have a satiety of titles, or they whose ambition may prompt them to attempt any thing to advance themselves?

In all likelihood, Countries, (whose depraved manners will not allow them to lift up virtue in distress, and which in truth cannot find such men to serve them, as were *Aristides*, *Socrates*, and those other heroes, whom we newly mentioned;) should desire to see themselves ruled in the subordinate parts of Government, by the best hands that can be possibly got: if it is to be come at, they should endeavour to have places of great honour and high trust, filled with persons, whose birth, estates, and other circumstances, seem, in human probability, to set them at least above the common temptations of the world.

He who has a good stake, will be afraid to engage in desperate councils; he who has a large estate will not consent to have the laws subverted, which are his firmest security; for where the sword governs, lands at best are held  
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but under a precarious title. They who are well born will desire to preserve that constitution, of which they and their ancestors have always been a part: instead of governing and making a figure in their country, in all appearance they will be loath to become the contemptible clients and dependants of some favourite or minister, whom chance or partiality shall set above his betters.

But they who come into a Government, with a design to build a family, and make a fortune; who are to get all, and can lose nothing, who are chiefly recommended by their boldness to undertake, and readiness to comply, whom no councils fright, and whom no measures shock; such men are indeed the proper instruments for introducing arbitrary power, but can hardly be thought fit ministers in any nation, that is desirous to preserve its freedom.

Whoever looks over our histories, will find, that all the attempts which were heretofore made upon the liberties of *England*, have been formed by such persons, as have been here described.

Most of our former Princes having had designs of absolute dominion, and finding that the men of fortune and figure would rather obstruct, than promote their intentions, thought it more conducing to their ends to be served by another sort of people, and did therefore bring into the management of their affairs all along a set of ministers, weak, ambitious, light, designing, rash, unskilful in the arts of wise administration.

ministration, and versed in nothing but craft and tricks; but at the head of these they had always some one that was to be the forlorn hope, and who would venture to go greater lengths than any of his companions; and for this post they generally chose a pushing man of a bold spirit, a ready wit, a fluent tongue, obscure and low in the world, and such a one whom fortune could hardly leave in a worse condition than she found him. Nor was it difficult to find persons of this character, who would hazard their heads, to compass power, wealth, and greatness. And though they could not arrive at unlimited monarchy, the philosopher's stone, our former statesmen have so much hunted after, yet in the search of it they found several other good things, we mean, good for themselves, that is to say, titles and great estates. It is true, many of them have been interrupted in their course, and the weight of the people has borne them down at last. But a man of a wretched beginning, never heard of before, when he sees himself lifted up high, seldom thinks of the laws, impeachments, and the axe. He hopes to elude justice; that the power which set him on, will bring him off; and that he may be defended by his numbers, and a corrupted majority devoted to him; or, as his predecessors have done, that he may at last retire full of wealth and crimes, and that his guilt will be covered in the fresher offences of those who are to succeed him: Or men of this stamp, when they have got all they can,

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may think to be forgiven by changing sides; and that it will be time enough to become good patriots, when they are no longer suffered to hurt the commonwealth; for the arms of the public have been but too open to embrace such a sort of penitents.

Upon these, or the like hopes, the *Cetbegi* and *Catalines* of former times have presumed to attack the liberties of *England*. It must therefore be a duty incumbent upon such as represent their country, *to hold a strong hand over the men of business.*

It would be endless to enumerate all the dangers that may befall a free Government, if it should have at the head of its affairs a minister of a bold and enterprising spirit, who, from a low degree, aspires to the highest greatness, and whose ambition is not restrained by any private or public considerations.

If in some future reigns it should be our case to have such a man in a station, and with the power of doing much hurt, all such as desire to preserve their civil rights, should with undaunted courage set themselves to stop him in his career, and to intercept him in his growth.

*Machiavel* says, *there is one rule infallible to Princes in the election of such as are to serve them. When you observe your officer more careful of himself than of you, and all his actions and designs pointing at his own interest and advantage, that man will never be a good minister.*

We shall beg the reader's pardon for one short digression in this place, and it is to take  
notice



notice of another fine remark of the same author, who says, *the actions of a new Prince are liable to a stricter observation, than if he were hereditary; and when they are known to be virtuous, gain more upon people, and oblige them farther than antiquity of blood, because men are more affected with present than passed things.* But to return to our matter.

The *Spaniards* were in a flourishing condition in *Richlieu's* time: and in the beginning of his ministry the affairs of *France* were in great disorder: he wholly attributes the prosperity of *Spain* to this principle (running through all their councils at that time, and prevailing with all their ministers) of preferring the public good to private interest; and the contrary obtaining in *France*, he says, was the cause of all their disorders. So that we may justly think the present greatness of the *French* has taken its rise from this noble principle, having gotten there, deeper footing now than it had heretofore.

Ministers, whose chief aim, in all they do, is their own greatness, can neither be good for Prince nor people. And when they consult their private interest more than the public good, it is, in many instances, apparent to all the world; as for example.

*First*, When they take no care of their master's revenue. For in all countries, and in all ages, bad statesmen have thriven best under princes plunged in debts and difficulties.

*Secondly*, When they have made a false step, and do not own it, and recede; but rather call  
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in the Prince's authority, and all more immediate dependants, to help them out, and to countenance their errors, it is a sign they have more regard to themselves, than to his honour.

*Thirdly*, When they enter upon new and desperate councils, which if they succeed well, will redound to their property glory; and if they should have a bad event, may hazard his ruin; it is a plain mark that they are ready to sacrifice his safety to their own vanity or ambition.

*Fourthly*, When they conceal from him truths which he ought to know; when they do not acquaint him with the state of his affairs, nor with the true condition of the nation; when they do not endeavour to moderate his expences; and when they do not quit, when sound councils cannot prevail, it is an evident proof, that they prefer keeping up their interest, as they call it, and holding their post and employments, to all other considerations whatsoever.

*Fifthly*, When they are ready to do any thing, let it be never so hurtful to their master, provided it square with the interest and measures of the party, of which they are at the head, and by whom they are buoyed up; it is a mark that they aim at, being independent even of the Prince himself, and that they think to subsist more by the strength of their own faction, than by his favour.

*Sixthly*, When man to man, and *singly*, they are willing to own any errors, but say at the same time, that they were against this and that, accusing their brethren of the state for every

every miscarriage, it is a sign, that provided they themselves are well thought on, they do not care what opinion the people entertain of the whole Government.

*Seventhly*, When they are for proposing dishonourable and unjust shifts to raise money, rather than to take the pains of forming before hand better schemes for ways and means, it is a sign that they prefer the momentary arts of recommending themselves to all thoughts whatsoever, and that they consult more their own ease than the public good. It is likewise an evidence that they are not of *Richlieu's* mind, who says, *that public administration takes up the thoughts of judicious ministers, insomuch that the perpetual meditations they are obliged to make, to foresee and prevent the evils that may happen, deprives them of all manner of rest and contentment, excepting that which they receive in seeing many sleep quietly, relying on their watchings, and live happy by their misery.*

*Eighthly*, When contrary to the constitution of the land, they promote councils which tend to the keeping up an armed force, it is a sign, that not daring to trust the laws, they would have their proceedings maintained another way; that they desire such an impunity as the sword, has seldom failed to give bad ministers in other countries. It is a mark, that their own safety is their principal object, and that they had rather the nation should be burthened with taxes, and have the form of government altered, and that the Prince should lose his subject's hearts,

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that venture themselves before a free and angry people.

We have given some of the marks, which selfish and designing statesmen may be known by hereafter. And if in future times it should be our case, to see persons of this character upon the stage of business, we must rouse up the vigour of our ancient constitution, we must awaken all the laws, and direct them boldly to the heads of such a dangerous sort of men.

*Machiavel* lays down, *That kingdoms, as well as commonwealths, have often occasion to be reduced to their first principles: Which, he says, was done in France by the Parliaments, who revived the ancient government, as often as they opposed the King in his arrests, and as often as they called great delinquents to account, whose crimes, if they are suffered to grow, cannot be reformed but with disorder, if not the dissolution of the whole government.*

For want of pursuing some such like courses, the *French* have lost their old constitution, and are now under the absolute sway of a single person; and that we in *England* continue still to be a free people, is, without doubt, chiefly owing to that power, which our ancestors have from time to time exerted, of impeaching such of the great ones, as they saw entering upon measures, which plainly tended to introduce unlimited dominion.

We have been hitherto preserved by pulling down such men, as were setting themselves and their master above the laws; and we shall transmit to posterity our civil rights untouched  
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and untainted, if we do not lose our wonted courage.

If therefore in any future reign, it should be seen, that the ministers waste the kingdom's treasure, that they misgovern or misapply it, that they break into appropriated funds; that they give advices which invade property, and which, in their consequences, tend to disaffect the people. And lastly, that to secure themselves they promote one council, which must end in the subversion of all the laws; if these things should come to appear, they who represent their country will not be afraid to attack these bold and high crimes with complaints, addresses, and impeachments; for if this be omitted, the impunity such men have found will engage so many new offenders, that at last, by their number, they grow safe, and above correction; and when this happens (as it has appeared in the instance of *France*) the liberties of a country are intirely lost.

When matters are become unquiet, by ill conduct, discerning Princes, like wise men who have a law-suit, desire to piece things up as soon as possible, and to remove the bone of dissention; as seeing full well, that troubles make the common people inquisitive, that inquiry gives them knowledge; and that when they have knowledge, they are very hard to govern.

But ill ministers often think, that the best course to save themselves, is yet farther to embroil their master's business, not considering,

that the more things grow disturbed, the greater necessity there will be of sacrificing them to appease the people's anger.

Statesmen should take great care how they contract public hatred: for both good and bad kings desert them at last, and with just reason; for he who has not judgment, conduct, and wisdom enough to avoid being odious, deserves not to be protected by his Prince, to his own hurt and danger.

Is there any instance of a wise, just, and good king (reigning so long as to have his virtues known) who had not the hearts and affection of his subjects? When plots are formed against such Princes, are they not presently defeated? And does not all mankind detest the conspirators? And let some flatterers say what they will, the vulgar are not impatient of any rule, that is tolerably fair and easy; at bottom they love the splendor of a Court, and are fond of regal power; so that Kings, who will but stoop the least to be popular, are doated upon, and idolized in every country.

The same thing holds in relation to ministers, if they are honest, if they have a superior genius, if they do not make too much haste to be rich, if they are notoriously seen to prefer the common welfare before their own private interest, if they are affable and industrious in doing good offices, if by their actions it is known that they do not desire to hold their stations upon any ignoble terms, if they are not haughty, arrogant, and insolent, they may  
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rule the state without clamours; they may grow grey in their dignities and offices; the best part of mankind will be constantly of their side. And if they are at any time attacked by private malice upon some disobligations or disappointment, their enemies will not be able to do them any hurt: Clouded they may be for a while, but they will soon shine out with fresher lustre. If by inadvertency, and through the frailty of human nature, they have made false steps, and committed small faults, the general voice will be ready to excuse them, and their perfections shall be put in the balances, and outweigh their errors.

But here it may be objected, that *Richlieu*, who was undoubtedly one of the greatest men that ever undertook the guidance of a state, and who had very near all the good qualities necessary for one to whom the reins of empire are committed, did, notwithstanding, lie under continual accusations, popular anger, and conspiracies against his person, To which we answer, that this Cardinal was a good minister for the *French King*, but not for *France*. He had all along designs to make his master absolute. It is true, he endeavoured by his sagacity, care, and deep foresight, to make the *French* as great and happy as a country can possibly be under an unlimited dominion: However, his foundation was not found at bottom, nor honest to human kind: He was therefore, from time to time, harrassed, interrupted, and perplexed by the few good patriots that remained,

mained, who had still an eye towards their antient constitution: Some, indeed, joined with these to oppose him, who did not act upon so right a principle.

But when the ministers in the measures they take to promote their master's greatness, consider their country's freedom, when, at one and the same time, they are trusty and impartial servants to Prince and country both; when they duly contemplate how unwise and wrong it is ever to let them have a divided interest; such statesmen as do all this, stand like rocks against whom the waves, stirred and moved forward by vulgar breath, beat in vain. They are safe, revered by the best sort, and the darlings of the people; such need not fear the scanning of their actions, popular anger, nor the secret machinations of discontented persons; their innocence is their sure guard, armed with which, they are not apprehensive of *impeachments*.

From what has been here said peradventure it will appear, that mixed Governments are not to be long preserved under their old form, unless such as represent their country *do bold a strong hand over the men of business, calling those to an account, who either through folly, or upon some wicked design, pursue destructive measures.*

But this high Cordial is not to be used upon every *slight* occasion; it was never intended by our ancestors to encounter distempers better cured another way, and to be then only administered when the body politic was sick at heart,

heart. Nothing can be admired and awful that at every turn is exposed to common view; *impeachments* are the law's supreme sword, which should be drawn only to cut off great offences; it should hang high, with the scabbard on, over the heads and in the view of such as meddle in matters of state, and when it is unsheathed, it should be in a way and manner so very terrible, as to make all offenders tremble.

If in times to come, our affairs should happen to be under an ill administration, the calamities that must thereby fall upon all degrees of men (those excepted who shall have enriched themselves by the public spoils) will stir up the legislative authority to interpose in looking after our future safety.

And at such a season, perhaps it will be thought the sublimest wisdom of all, not to be angry with persons but to mend things, and that it will not import much though the criminal escape unpunished, so the fault can be corrected. The remorse and shame of having, may be, *in a few years ruined a rich and flourishing people* (for so the case may happen) will be punishment enough to those who have left in them any seeds of honour.

Such therefore as mean their country well in an unhappy juncture of this nature, when they go to give affairs a better complexion, should in all likelihood begin their work by determining and pronouncing **what councils have been directly against the law, what advices have tended to impoverish the crown and kingdom,**



dom, and what practices have wasted the nation's treasure. And when in this solemn manner they have condemned the offences, if they think fit, the offenders may be reached with ease.

If we should ever have a set of statesmen whose offences will compel the nation to accuse them, they will endeavour to cover their own faults by recriminating upon the proceedings of former times. If they are charged with wasting the public treasure, with giving away the crown-lands, with aiming at arbitrary power, and to govern by the sword, they will be so audacious to think they stand justified by answering, *the same things were heretofore done*. But they ought to make this reflection, that King *Charles* was in danger to lose his crown, and that King *James* actually lost it, because his ministers pursued measures destructive to the kingdom.

And now in a few words to recapitulate the whole matter of this long section; if such as represent the people are uncorrupt, unbiaſſed, and diſinterested; if they diligently attend the nation's ſervice; if they carefully watch encroachments upon the conſtitution; if they make provision againſt future evils; if they look narrowly into the debts and expences of the nation; if they hold a ſtrong hand over the men of buſineſs; And if in this manner *private perſons perform their duty to the public*, we ſhall not fail in all ſucceeding times, to ſee *a ſteady courſe of honeſty and wiſdom in ſuch as are truſted with the adminiſtration of affairs*.

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For it may be laid down for a certain maxim, that statesmen will hardly be negligent, corrupt, or arbitrary, when they are overlooked with careful eyes by so considerable a part of the constitution.

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To these sentiments of an honest and wise political writer, the Editor will not pretend to add any thing: The conjectures of Dr. Davenant are so well considered, as to furnish ample matter for serious thought to every dispassionate friend to the constitution, who is willing to apply his mind to the subject, and to exert himself, according to his situation, in his country's cause. If this can be attained, then, indeed, would the object of this re-publication be fully answered.

In the writings of Mr. *Locke*, and of *President Montesquieu*, the same fatal consequences may be collected from the opinions by them delivered, on the dangers which the English constitution may have, in future days, to apprehend. In these concurring testimonies, the fall of this mighty fabric will be inevitable, if ever the connection becomes too intimate between the executive power, and the Houses of Parliament. The overthrow, from not being immediate, would not be less certain; nor would the nation perceive, in time, the instruments employed in sapping the foundation of its liberties. After a masterly eulogium on the justly ballanced power of the constitution  
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of *England*; and after having stated, that the established laws entitled the people to all the blessings resulting from so free a state, *Montesquieu* acknowledges, that he does not pretend to assert, that the *English* were in actual enjoyment of these blessings; but he concludes with this remarkable and prophetic denunciation, “ Comme toutes les choses humaines ont une fin, l'état, dont nous parlons, perdra sa liberté, il perira. Rome, Lacedemone, & Carthage ont bien péri. *Il perira, lorsque la puissance législative sera plus corrompue que l'exécutrice.*”

In another place, the same writer makes also this observation, “ Les Anglois ont bien raison de conserver cette liberté; s'ils venoient à la perdre, ils seroient un des peuples les plus esclaves de la terre.”

F I N I S.